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DIVERSION OF CHURCH FUNDS TO
PERSONAL USE: STATE, FEDERAL
AND PRIVATE SANCTIONS
The chief wrong which false prophets do to their following is not financial. The
collections aggregate a tempting total, but individual payments are not ruinous . .
But the real harm is on the mental and spiritual plane. There are those who hunger
and thirst after higher values which they feel wanting in their humdrum lives. They
live in mental confusion or moral anarchy and seek vaguely for truth and beauty and
moral support. When they are deluded and then disillusioned, cynicism and confusion
follow. The wrong of these things, as Isee it, is not in the money the victimspart with
half so much as in the mental and spiritual poison they get. *
I. INTRODUCTION: THE VULNERABILITY OF RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS TO FISCAL ABUSE
Religious organizations are institutions of public trust. Church
members as well as the general public reasonably expect church officials
to fulfill their religious calling and apply church funds to religious pur-
poses. What these religious purposes should be is within the discretion
of church officials or the congregation,' which makes it nearly impossi-
ble to objectively define "religious purpose." Despite the discretionary
nature of church expenditures, there remains a general expectation that
church funds will not be diverted, apart from any bona fide charitable
gifts, to benefit private individuals.
Religious organizations, however, are vulnerable to fiscal abuse be-
cause neither church members nor the government closely monitors
their financial affairs. If a religious organization were formed for eco-
nomic purposes rather than for the spiritual and charitable needs of a
community, members having a financial stake in the organization could
• United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 94-95 (1944)(Jackson, J., dissenting).
How a church spends its money is, generally, an ecclesiastical matter within the exclu-
sive province of the church's decision makers. See, e.g., Galich v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
75 Ill. App. 3d 538, 547, 394 N.E.2d 572, 579 (1979), cerl. denied, 445 U.S. 916 (1980) (absent a
specific trust, disposition of church property is an ecclesiastical decision); Knight v. Presby-
tery of Western New York, 18 N.Y.2d 868, 222 N.E.2d 738 (1968) (church payments for
purpose of bringing Industrial Areas Foundation to Buffalo, N.Y. was an ecclesiastical mat-
ter). But see Inquiry, Etc., of Criminal Procedure Law, 78 Misc. 2d 244, 356 N.Y.S.2d 749
(1974) (church pastor acted outside scope of his powers in putting up collateral to secure bail
bond for murder defendant; indemnity is ultra vires the church, contrary to public policy,
and against interest of church members).
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be expected to monitor more closely the use of church funds.2 If consti-
tutional problems did not present themselves, the government could be
expected to examine the financial affairs of religious bodies on an ongo-
ing basis.3
On the other hand, religious organizations are probably less vulner-
able to fiscal abuse than secular organizations. 4 Church members and
contributors put their trust in the moral integrity of church trustees,
who, if not accountable to anyone else, are accountable to a Supreme
Being.5 Furthermore, there is the deterrent effect of civil or even crimi-
nal liability which may be imposed on a church official who breaches his
duty of trust.
Still, the vulnerability remains. In January of 1981, a federal grand
jury in Chicago began investigating whether the late John Cardinal
Cody of the Catholic Archdiocese of Chicago had illegally diverted as
much as one million dollars in tax-exempt church funds to enrich a life-
long friend.1 These allegations are unique in two respects. First, the
more common charge of misuse of religious funds has been an allegation
that a church official has diverted funds for personal use rather than for
2 Even if members of religious organizations had a more direct interest in the financial
affairs of their churches, they may not be able to monitor church finances. In Illinois, the
reigning Catholic bishop of Chicago is the owner for legal purposes of all real and personal
property of the archdiocese under the concept of "Corporation Sole." 1861 Illinois Private
Laws, at 78. The Catholic bishop's power is absolute in deciding whether key financial infor-
mation should be distributed to priests and laymen in the archdiocese or other individuals in
the church hierarchy. Clements, Mustain & Larson, Cody absolute ruler under law, Chi. Sun-
Times, Sept. 11, 1981, at 4, col. 1. But cf. Bourgeois v. Landrum, 396 So.2d 1275, 1277 (La.
1981) (voting members of a church who are given the statutory right to examine church
records may do so under reasonable conditions). Bishops of dioceses in 16 other states also
operate as corporations sole, although under common law, Catholic bishops are not consid-
ered the owner of church assets, but are mere administrators. Id. Corporations sole existed at
common law, along with corporations aggregate, and consisted of one person occupying a
particular office who was incorporated by law to vest in him certain legal capacities and
advantages.
3 See infra text accompanying notes 120-25.
4 It is significant that religious institutions are not plagued by more wrongdoing than is
reported when over $18 billion is contributed yearly to religious organizations. See C. BAKAL,
CHARITY USA 85 (1979).
5 See Rossi & Mustain, Cardinal "Answerable to Rome, God- Lawyer, Chi. Sun-Times, Sept.
12, 1981, at 1, col. I.
6 Clements, Mustain & Larson, Federal grandjug probes Cardin'al Cody use of church funds,
Chi. Sun-Times, Sept. 10, 1981, at 1, col. 1; Winston, Chicago Archbishop Under US Inqui7 on
Funds, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1981 at 16, col. 1.
John Cardinal Cody died on April 25, 1982. The federal grand jury investigation of the
alleged misuse of funds of the Chicago Archdiocese did not end with Cardinal Cody's death,
however, and the investigation shifted to focus on those individuals who might have improp-
erly received church funds. Clements, Mustain & Larson, US pursues church find investigation,
Chi. Sun-Times, May 7, 1982, at 1, col. 3. The grand jury investigation was closed in July,
1982. Clements & Nicodemus, Cody Probe Closed By US., Chi. Sun-Times, July 7, 1982, at 1,
col. 1.
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the benefit of a third party. 7 Second, recent interest in the role of gov-
ernment regulation of religious groups has focused on the illegal or devi-
ant behavior of members of cults, sects, and nontraditional churches,"
and state intrusion into the internal affairs of these organizations has not
represented a direct threat to well-established institutions such as the
Roman Catholic Church. 9
In the wake of the Cardinal Cody controversy, there is a need to
explore the constitutional dimensions of state involvement in the in-
ternal financial affairs of religious organizations and determine the ap-
propriate role that the state should have when church funds are spent
for blatantly nonreligious purposes or when they are diverted to benefit
private individuals.
II. RESPONDING TO FISCAL ABUSE
No one should be able to convert money to personal use with impu-
nity, whether the funds belong to a secular corporation or a church.
Society has had relatively little problem in responding to corporate em-
bezzlement, for example, inasmuch as society views this white-collar
crime as theft. More troubling, however, are those instances where reli-
gious leaders engage in similar conduct. Instead of saying that the
preacher has embezzled or stolen ten thousand dollars, we resort to eu-
phemism and say that he or she has "diverted church money to private
use."' 0 We as a society are not accustomed to thinking that our spiritual
leaders can commit criminal acts, and we are reluctant to take decisive
action to combat this kind of wrongdoing.
However, merely to say that church officials who misappropriate
funds should be punished would be to gloss over important issues. What
kinds of sanctions and who should be responsible for imposing those
7 See, e.g., Worldwide Church of God, Inc. v. California, 623 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1980);
Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1009 (1970).
8 Noteworthy is the public concern generated in the Jonestown tragedy. In November of
1978, approximately 900 members of the California based People's Temple died in a ritual of
mass suicide and murder in Jonestown, Guyana. N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1978, at 1, col. 6.
9 Nontraditional churches sometimes follow religious practices that threaten the health
and safety of their members or deviate so drastically from community standards as to be
repugnant to public welfare. See Comment, People v. Rehgious Cults.- legal Gnidelinesfor Criminal
Activities, Tort Liabih, and Parental Remedies, I1 SUFF. U.L. REv. 1025, 1031-32 (1977);
LeMoult, Deprogramming Members of Religious Sects, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 599 (1978). Laws
that prohibit these activities would have no impact on traditional churches and their
practices.
10 See Clements, Mustain & Larson, supra note 6. Another explanation for our using the
term "diversion" stems from its traditional use in intra-church property disputes; property or
funds held by a church or its officers in trust for specific purposes may not be diverted to any
other use. 76 C.J.S. Reh'gious Societies § 68 (1952). Stealing church money can be subsumed
into this broader category.
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sanctions are the most important issues that legislators or state officials
will have to confront. Moreover, it is not enough to answer affirma-
tively the question whether the state can impose sanctions against
church officials who divert church monies wrongfully, for the ultimate
question really is whether the state should interfere. This Comment con-
siders the advantages and limitations to possible state, federal, and pri-
vate legal action that can be taken in response to fiscal abuse in the
church in order to determine whether the acts of religious leaders should
be subject to state scrutiny. The discussion concludes that the govern-
ment can interfere and argues that state legislators and officers must
take a more active role in protecting church funds from corrupt church
officials.
A. STATE RESPONSE
Religious officials who misuse church monies can be criminally or
civilly liable only so long as state or federal government officials have
the authority to take legal action in this area, courts can adjudicate the
conflict, and religious freedom is not unconstitutionally infringed in the
process. The most obvious limitation on governmental action is the con-
stitutional guarantee of the free exercise of religion. The first amend-
ment provides, in part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting the
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
... ," The religion clauses were held applicable to the states in
Cantwell v. Connecticut.12 Where the government intervenes in church af-
fairs when a religious official misuses church funds, a question as to the
free exercise of religion is inevitable because it can be argued that the
government is attempting to regulate how religious officials spend
church monies. This regulation also involves a danger of church-state
entanglement, an argument associated with the establishment clause.13
Less obvious, however, are more practical problems that government
officials must face when they suspect that church funds have heen mis-
appropriated. Government officials seeking to institute suits against
church wrongdoers must confront the issue of whether they have the
authority to intervene. Before discussing the first amendment limitation
to governmental power, it is appropriate to outline the sources of gov-
ernmental power from which state officials can exercise jurisdiction' 4
II U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
13 See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
14 Viewing the separation of church and state as a jurisdictional matter has led one com-
mentator to apply a conflict of laws analogy to religious exemption doctrine. Note, Reliious
Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorites, 90 YALE LJ. 350,
365-69 (1980).
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over the internal affairs of religious institutions and to consider the prac-
tical limitations to governmental action.
Despite first amendment limitations, the church as a religious body
is not totally free from state regulation. Thomas Jefferson wrote that the
first amendment builds a "wall of separation between Church and
State."' 5 This "wall of separation," however, is subject to state intrusion
where the state has a legitimate interest to protect."i For example, the
state has an interest in public health, safety, order, and welfare and may
regulate religious activity under its police power.' 7 A state legislature
invoking this general power could, for instance, specifically authorize its
attorney general to examine the financial books of churches if wrongful
activity is suspected and to institute state action to correct the wrongful
activity. 8 Absent any enabling statute, the state's attorney could pro-
15, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting a letter that Thomas Jef-
ferson wrote to the Danbury Baptist Association).
16 In Reynolds, the Supreme Court distinguished between the freedom of religious belief
and the freedom of religious action guaranteed by the free exercise clause of the first amend-
ment. Id at 164. The majority indicated that the government was free to prohibit any action
regardless of its religious implications so long as it did not prohibit a belief. Chief Justice
Waite stated: "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left
free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order." Id
The action-belief dichotomy has been subsequently eroded because belief and practice are
often inseparably intertwined. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219-20 (1972); Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). However, actions "'subversive of good order" are still
clearly subject to regulation. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
17 Id. at 306-07.
18 For example, the California legislature enacted a nonprofit corporation law in 1980;
Section 9230 of the new law authorized the California attorney general to examine religious
corporations for wrongful activity, and to initiate a state civil action to correct the wrongful
activity. Section 9230 (a) formerly read:
Upon reasonable grounds to believe that the following condition or conditions have
occurred or do exist, the Attorney General may, at reasonable times, examine a corpora-
tion to determine whether:
(1) the corporation fails to qualify as a religious corporation under this part; or
(2) there is or has been any fraudulent activity in connection with the corporation's
property; or
(3) any corporate property is or has been improperly diverted for the personal bene-
fit of any person; or
(4) property solicited and received from the general public based on a representa-
tion that it would be used for a limited purpose other than general support of the corpo-
ration's religious activities, has been improperly used in a manner inconsistent with the
stated purpose for which the property was solicited; or
(5) there has been a substantial diversion of corporate assets from stated corporate
purposes.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 9230(a) (West Supp. 1980)(repealed 1980). Prior to its enactment, the
California Attorney General had instituted legal proceedings against the Worldwide Church
of God pursuant to allegations that church officials had fraudulently diverted church funds
for personal use. See Worldwide Church of God, Inc. v. California, 623 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.
1980). The complaint in Worldwide alleged that church financial officer Stanley Rader and
church leader Herbert Armstrong were liquidating church properties on a massive scale, at
prices below market value, so that church assets would be in "a form in which they may be
more easily appropriated to the personal use and benefit of the individual defendants." Peo-
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ceed pursuant to a fraud or embezzlement provision of the state's crimi-
nal code.' 9
Another possible approach would be a nonstatutory state civil ac-
tion based on the theory that the attorney general is charged with pro-
tecting church assets which are held subject to a public or charitable
trust.2 0 The attorney general could seek to impose a receivership, en-
join conduct, rescind transactions, remove trustees, compel an account-
ing, or sue for damages. Instead of involving the right of the state to
control actions under its power to protect the public health, safety and
general welfare, the state's right to intervene would be based on the
state's obligation to protect the public interest in situations where there
is no individual capable of asserting the interest.
This approach rests on the assumption that church assets are suffi-
ciently analogous to the assets of charitable trusts, being held and dedi-
cated, in theory at least, to benefit the general public. Because the
enforcement of public or charitable trusts traditionally could not be
maintained either by the donor 2 ' or the ultimate beneficiary (the gen-
ple v. Worldwide Church of God, Inc., No. C-267-607 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. filed
Jan. 2, 1979), Complaint at 7-8. Church leaders unsuccessfully sought certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court four times to halt court orders issued in the litigation. World-
wide Church of God, Inc. v. California, 449 U.S. 900 (1980); Worldwide Church of God, Inc.
v. Supreme Court of California, 446 U.S. 987 (1980); Rader v. Superior Court of California,
444 U.S. 916 (1979); Worldwide Church of God, Inc. v. Superior Court of California, 444
U.S. 883 (1979) (certiorari petitions in response to unreported decisions by California court of
appeals). However, shortly after its enactment, the California legislature repealed § 9230 and
substituted in its place a new § 9230 that prospectively forbade the Attorney General from
initiating this kind of litigation, and the suit was finally dropped. See California Planning to Halt
Cases on Church ofGodand S)ynanon, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1980, at A28, col. 4. For an exhaustive
analysis of the constitutional issues raised by the repealed California statute, see Note, Govern-
ment Protection of Church Assetsfiom FiscalAbuse. The Constitutionality ofAttomni General Enforcement
under the Religion Clauses of the Frst Amendment, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1277 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Attorney General Enforcement]. See also Wiley, A Constitutional Outraqe, 74 LIBERTY 3
(May-June 1979); Worthing, The State Takes Over a Church, 446 ANNALS 136 (1979); Note, Does
Court Ordered Receivership Breach the Wall of Separation Between Church and State?, 6 WEST ST. L.
REv. 269 (1979).
19 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Nichols, 206 Pa. Super. 352, 213 A.2d 105 (1965) (Bishop of
African Methodist Episcopal Church had been charged with embezzlement and fraudulent
conversion of church funds); Lawson v. State, 492 P.2d 1108 (Okl. Crim. App. 1971).
20 In Worldwide, the Attorney General relied on the theory that all church assets are sub-
ject to a public or charitable trust and that his office was authorized to enforce the trust under
the California Corporations Code and the common law. Attorno , General Enforcement, supra
note 18, at 1281.
21 Traditionally, a donor who parts with his entire interest in property had no standing to
compel the execution of a charitable trust. 2J. PERRY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES § 732 (a), at 1255-56 (7th ed. 1929); RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TRUSTS
§ 391, Comment (e) (1959). However, where express conditions attach to a gift of property,
the donor should have standing. For example, in Dunaway v. First Presbyterian Church of
Wickenburg, 103 Ariz. 349,442 P.2d 93 (1968), a donor who had given $10,000 worth of stock
to a church for the express purpose of erecting a Sunday school building was able to reclaim
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eral public), the attorney general historically was charged with the duty
to enforce charitable trusts.22 The attorney general is the chief law en-
forcement officer of most jurisdictions to intervene in the administration
of charitable trusts or corporations when she or he has reason to believe
that they are being administered in violation of the trust instrument or
in contravention of state law.
Theoretically, however, the analogy to charitable trusts may prove
too much and, in most cases, will not necessarily serve as an adequate
rationale upon which an attorney general can proceed against a church
official.2 :3 Where church funds have been illegally diverted, church
members or officials may be capable of asserting a protective interest in
the funds.24 Still, the analogy would be appropriate where individuals
the funds when the church subsequently designated the funds to be used to purchase a lot
across the street.
22 4 G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, TlEt L.awv o' TRUSTS ANDt TRL'S'EES § 411, at 407-14 (2d
rev. ed. 1977). Charitable trusts give rise to the creation of public funds, and the attorney
general is charged with the duty of protecting these funds because his office represents the
interests of the state and its citizens. Id See also People v. Larkin, 413 F. Supp. 978 (N.D.
Cal. 1976); People v. Christ's Church of the Golden Rule, 79 Cal. App. 2d 858, 181 P.2d 49
(1947).
23 Whereas a charity holds its property in trust for the public, a church does not necessar-
ily act as the public's trustee. In United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 516
(1979), the Supreme Court held that a church "did not hold its property as the public's
trustee and thus is not entitled to be indemnified for the public's loss." The issue was whether
the fifth amendment compensation clause required payment of replacement cost or fair mar-
ket value for the condemnation of church property used as camps.
In a different context, the Court indicated that there are important public benefits de-
rived from religious organizations which make unique contributions to the pluralism of
American society through their purely religious activities. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S.
664, 689 (1970). Society grants immunity from taxation in return for the contributions that
scientific, literary, educational or religious organizations make in furthering our moral and
intellectual diversity. Whether these benefits justify labelling church assets as public property
held in trust requires a substantial leap over Jefferson's "wall of separation" between church
and state. In 14alz, the Court refused to justify a religious property tax exemption on the
social welfare services or good works that some churches perform because other churches
engage exclusively in divine worship, yet qualify for an exemption. The Court reasoned that
to require the government to evaluate the quantity and quality of social services would "give
rise to confrontations that would escalate to constitutional dimensions" resulting in excessive
governmental entanglement with religion. Id at 674. Because some churches do not engage
in social welfare services, it would be difficult to say, even on a theoretical level, that church
funds are held in trust for the public as charities hold their property. Yet, religious organiza-
tions are likely to be treated as charitable corporations in determining whether an attorney
general can intervene in their financial affairs. See Synanon Foundation, Inc. v. California,
444 U.S. 1307 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice, 1979).
24 See, e.g., Church of Hakeem, Inc. v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 3d 384, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 13 (1980)(holding that former church members bringing a civil fraud action against
church leaders could not obtain the church's membership list because requiring production of
church list would violate rights of association). See also Providence Baptist Church v. Supe-
rior Court, 40 Cal. 2d 55, 251 P.2d 10 (1952); Greater Pleasant Green Baptist Church v.
Robertson, 343 So.2d 239 (La. App. 1977).
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specifically set up a church to exploit money solicited from the general
public and there is no congregation in the traditional sense.
B. PRIVATE RESPONSE
Unlike charities, religious organizations often have congregations
that are in fairly close contact with church officials, and members may
be in a position to initiate a civil action; members have specific interests
in the religious affairs of the church and are direct beneficiaries of serv-
ices that the church provides. A breach of a church official's fiduciary
duty may operate to directly affect the interests of a congregation and
create an injury in fact to church members.2 5 When such an injury oc-
curs, members should have standing to sue in court for appropriate civil
relief.
26
The limitation on membership enforcement of the religious "trust"
is that church members are not usually in a position2 7 to detect and
uncover fraud in a religious organization, and even if they are, may not
be inclined 28 or financially equipped to oppose church officials. More-
over, as shareholders bring derivative suits to recover funds for a corpo-
ration, church members would be suing to recover funds for their
church in most cases; benefits would accrue directly to the church and
only indirectly to the congregation. 29 Thus, church members probably
lack sufficient incentives to institute a civil suit against their church
25 For example, if church officials who divert funds to personal use cause the loss of a
church's tax exemption, the loss of the exemption in turn will cause a loss of the tax deducti-
ble status of religious donations. See hnfra note 54. Members would suffer the loss of a financial
benefit.
26 Church members will sometimes have standing based entirely on their own injuries.
See Church of Hakeem, Inc. v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 3d 384, 168 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1980). Absent a direct injury to church members, a need for the attorney general to intervene
would arise if a particular jurisdiction refuses to allow church members to sue derivately
through their church and church trustees refuse to bring suit. Some courts hold that members
of a church may not sue in the name of the church corporation in the absence of a demand
made on officers authorized to act, or of a showing that such demand would be unavailing,
but they may do so where the trustees of the religious corporation refuse to bring suit. 76
C.J.S. Religious Societies § 75 (1952). For a case that raised the question of whether the church
could raise the rights of its members, see Church of Scientology of California v. Cazares, 638
F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1981).
27 Even where the major part of church funding comes from members' contributions,
there is nothing to indicate that members will exercise more supervision and control of their
religious organizations. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. 1673 (1982).
28 Congregations often support clergymen even when they have been charged officially
with a crime. Weeding Out Clergymen Who Go Astray, U.S. NEWs & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 2,
1978, at 64.
29 However, church members as contributors could recover funds themselves where they
have been the victims of a fraudulent solicitation scheme. See Church of Hakeem, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 3d 384, 168 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1980).
COMMENTS
leaders. 30
Preventing and correcting fiscal abuse, however, may be possible at
another level in the church. Within a local church, church officials
themselves may be able to monitor the financial affairs of the church so
that if one church officer or trustee ever wrongfully diverts church
funds, church officials could detect the wrongdoing and institute a civil
action to recover the diverted funds. If the church organization is hier-
archical in structure,3 1 separate branches of the church could be in a
position to detect and remedy wrongdoing at different levels of the
church organization. 32 A civil action brought by church officials against
another official could be maintained on the same basis that civil courts
entertain intra-church property disputes according to "neutral princi-
ples. ' '3:1 The availability of this remedy, however, depends on internal
checks and balances which may or may not exist in a religious organiza-
tion. If there are relatively few church leaders, all of whom are exploit-
ing members and the general public through fraudulent solicitations,
then there would be no one in the leadership ranks to assert the cause of
action.
Church officials instituting legal action against members of their
own organization would be an effective means to protect chuch interests
if funds are recovered. Yet, religious leaders, for practical considera-
tions, may decide to cover up any scandal before it becomes public and
discretely remove the wrongdoer who has diverted church funds to per-
sonal use without taking any further action.1 4 Furthermore, they may
choose to absorb the impact of the scandal after it has become public
and thereafter conduct religious services as usual without suing the of-
30 See genera4, M. Or.SON, LOGIC OF COLLEcTIvE AcTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THE-
ORY OF GROUPS (1971).
31 As defined in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 726 (1872), a hierarchical church
is a "religious congregation which is itself part of a large general organization of some reli-
gious denomination, with which it is more or less intimately connected by religious views and
ecclesiastical government." The local congregation in a hierarchical church is a member of a
much larger religious organization subject to its orders and judgments. In contrast, a congre-
gational church is an independent organization governed internally either by a majority of its
members or by a local body instituted for the purpose of ecclesiastical governance.
32 The Roman Catholic Church is internally divided into the Holy See, the papacy, the
patriarchates, provinces, archdioceses, dioceses and parishes, and the religious orders. Some of
these ecclesiastical entities are further subdivided into smaller corporations and trusts. Yet,
this division may not necessarily serve as an effective mechanism for the internal monitoring
of how church funds are used. See supra note 2.
33 See infra text accompanying notes 95-98. The neutral principles approach, which per-
mits courts to settle church property disputes without becoming entangled in questions of
religious doctrine, is "completely secular in operation." Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603
(1979).
34 Weeding Out Clergymen Who Go Astray, supra note 28, at 64. The fact that a church official
has wasted diverted funds and is "judgment proof" would lead to the same result.
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fending party so that a civil action does not protract the scandal.3 5
Church leaders may have both practical and religious reasons for adopt-
ing this course of action. Dissatisfied members, in turn, could leave indi-
vidually or an entire group could splinter from the ruling body. The
leaders in choosing not to seek restitution, however, could face harsher
consequences and incur severe tax liability for their church if the *federal
government imposes sanctions and retroactively revokes its tax exempt
status after determining that church monies have "inured" to the bene-
fit of private parties.3 6
C. FEDERAL RESPONSE
The federal government can directly impose sanctions against
church officials who misappropriate funds. For example, the federal
government has prosecuted church officials for mail fraud, charging
them with fraudulently soliciting contributions for a church through the
mail while converting the funds to their own use.3 7 Furthermore, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) can charge a church official with crimi-
nal tax fraud 38 for failure to report misappropriated funds on his indi-
35 Whether the state should interfere at this point depends on what interest is really at
stake. If the church suffers an injury at the hands of a wrongdoer, and can therefore be
identified as the real party in interest, should not those disinterested leaders acting in good
faith be able to decide what action, if any, should be taken against the offending party? Or
should the state intervene because it has a duty to protect the interests of its citizens who have
donated funds to the church with the expectation that church leaders will not pocket the
funds? In fact, there are actually three parties in interest who suffer when church monies are
diverted to private individuals: the church, church members, and the donating public.
Where a church and its members decide not to sue, the state retains a sufficient, although
arguably less compelling justification for its intervention.
36 See infra text accompanying notes 40-45. Whether the federal government could re-
voke the tax exempt status of a church even where leaders institute an action for restitution
against the wrongdoer is unclear, however, for this issue has not yet arisen in federal tax cases
involving religious organizations. Presumably there would be no need for the federal govern-
ment to either retroactively or prospectively revoke a church's tax exempt status if the church
attempts to remedy any wrongdoing.
37 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1948); see United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); United States
v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981).
38 I.R.C. §§ 7201-7207 (1981). Recently, the Reverend Sun Myung Moon, founder of the
Unification Church which has approximately 3 million members, was convicted of conspiring
to avoid taxes on $162,000 in personal income. Lubasch, Rev. Moon Is Convicted of Income Tax
Fraud, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1982, at 1, co. 3. The federal government also has begun to
charge "mail order ministers" with criminal tax evasion. A mail order minister obtains his
credentials from a "church" for a small fee and then donates all of his property and income to
the church which then pays the minister's living expenses. See Kurtz, Di&cult Defmitial
Problems in Tax Administration." Reliqion and Race, 23 CATH. LAW. 301, 305 (1978); Note, Mail
Order Ministries: The Religious Purpose Exemption, and the Constitution, 33 TAX LAW. 959 (1980).
In 1980, a Texas airline pilot became the first of these ministers to be charged and convicted
as a tax evader, and was sentenced to four years in prison and fined $5,000. Crewdson, ZR.S
is Challenging Mail-Order Pastors, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1981, at 14, col. 1. The pilot, Charles
Kageler, claimed that his expensive home, the House of Kageler, was a parsonage and that
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vidual tax return, or simply sue him for unpaid taxes.
The federal government can also impose sanctions against the
church itself. The IRS can retroactively or prospectively revoke the
church's tax exemption.3 9 Less burdensome than a criminal prosecution
of church officials and much more beneficial for the federal treasury, the
withdrawal of a church's tax exempt status stands as a potentially effec-
tive alternative to the criminal law in preventing individuals from di-
verting church monies for personal profit. Theoretically, the threat of
the revocation of its tax exemption should compel church officials to
police the church's financial affairs to prevent wrongdoing and give
these officials a strong incentive to rid the church of anyone diverting
funds so that the church may regain its tax exemption.
Section 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code provides in part
that an organization will not qualify for tax-exempt status unless "no
part of. . .[its] net earnings inures to the benefit of any private individ-
ual or shareholder."'40 The private inurement test is one prong of the
operational test of the Internal Revenue Code.4 1 Section 501(c)(3) re-
quires that a church or other religious organization must be organized
and operated exclusively for a religious purpose to qualify for tax-ex-
empt status.4 2 The federal government will deny tax-exempt status to a
church or will revoke its tax-exempt status if it fails to meet either the
organizational or operational test. An organization will be deemed or-
ganized exclusively for a tax-exempt purpose if the organization's arti-
cles of incorporation both limit its purposes to one or more exempt
purposes and do not expressly empower it to engage in activities which
his private Cessna belonged to a church. Id. Mail order ministers previously were charged
only with civil tax fraud. Id See also Peister v. United States, 631 F.2d 658 (10th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1980).
39 Tax exemptions have been revoked successfully from religious groups which have en-
gaged in proscribed political activities, Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United
States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973), or funnelled church
money to the benefit of private individuals. Founding Church of Scientology v. United
States, 412 F.2d 1197 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970); Incorporated Trustees
of Gospel Worker Society v. United States, 5 10 F. Supp. 374 (D.D.C. 1981) (primary purpose
is profits, not salvation). See also Zion Coptic Church, Inc. v. United States, 79-1 U.S.T.C.
9325 (S.D. Fla. 1979). Recently, churches have been called upon by the Internal Revenue
Service to reveal more about their finances to determine if they should be able to continue to
claim tax exempt status. See United States v. Dykema. 666 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Holmes, 614 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Miller, 609 F.2d 336 (8th Cir.
1979); United States v. Coates, 526 F. Supp. 248 (E.D. Cal. 1981).
40 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)(1981).
41 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2).
42 In one interesting case, the IRS retroactively revoked a church's tax exemption noting
that church members had purchased 33 tons of marijuana valued at $3.3 million. The result-
ing tax liability for the church was approximately $2 million. Zion Coptic Church, Inc. v.
United States, 79-1 U.S.T.C. 9325 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
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do not further those purposes.43 An organization will be regarded as
operated exclusively for exempt purposes only if: (1) it engages primar-
ily in activities which accomplish one or more exempt purposes; 44 (2)
none of its net earnings inures to the benefit of private shareholders or
individuals; 45 and (3) it is not designated an "action" organization by
engaging in activities designed to influence legislation.
46
A diversion of funds need not be particularly egregious for the IRS
to revoke or deny the tax exemption. The inurement standard of the
Internal Revenue Code covers a wider range of conduct than is nor-
mally associated with fraud, embezzlement, or theft. Inurement, in
some cases, simply amounts to self-dealing,47 and would not be the kind
of misconduct that either a state's attorney's office or church member
would find alarming.
48
Nor does the decision whether to prospectively or retroactively re-
voke a church's exemption necessarily turn on the seriousness of alleged
wrongdoing. The IRS has discretion to make its revocation retroactive
where an organization furnished misleading information in applying for
a ruling, omitted material facts, omitted answers required on informa-
tion forms, or failed to report organizational or operational changes af-
fecting its charitable or religious functions.49 Where there is a material
change that is inconsistent with the character, purpose or method of
operation, revocation will ordinarily take effect as of the date of the ma-
terial change.50 The IRS has retroactively revoked the exemptions of
43 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(l)(i)
44 Id at § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1).
45 Id. at § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2).
46 Id at § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3).
47 The analogy to the concept of self-dealing has been recognized by other authors. See
Note, supra note 38, at 970 n.71. In Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412
F.2d 1197 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970), inurement to the church's founder
and his wife consisted of the payment of a percentage of the church's gross income in addition
to salary, as well as unexplained loans, rental charges, and royalties and commissions for use
of the founder's publications. Although a payment of a reasonable salary to a minister will
not result in a finding of inurement, unreasonable compensation, rental charges, and loans
can amount to self-dealing. See Incorporated Trustees of Gospel Worker Society v. United
States, 510 F. Supp. 374 (D.D.C. 1981)(head of religious organization earning over $100,000
annually suggestive of commercial rather than nonprofit operation).
48 Self-dealing, however, can reach objectionable levels. For example, the treasurer of the
New York Annual Conference of the United Methodists Church was reported to have im-
properly loaned over $5 million to companies in which he had a financial interest. N.Y.L.J.,
Jan. 30, 1980, at 1, col. 2.
49 Proc. Rules § 601.201(n)(6)(i).
50 See, e.g., Stevens Bros. Foundation, Inc.; 39 T.C. 93 (1962), af'd, 324 F.2d 633 (8th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 969 (1964). Incorporated Trustees of Gospel Worker Society v.
United States, 510 F. Supp. 374, 380 (D.D.C. 1981).
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religious organizations.5 1
The effect of either a retroactive or prospective revocation is to
punish the religious organization itself for the indiscretions of its lead-
ers. 52 This might not be such a bad result where a "church" is set up for
the sole purpose of exploiting the tax shelter afforded religious institu-
tions,5 3 but it may seem unjust where the offending activity occurs
within a bona fide religious organization where members have a stake
not only in the assets of the church, but also in the tax deductible status
of their contributions.54 Because the revocation of its tax-exempt status
hurts the church and the church has no conceivable interest in a diver-
sion of church funds, it may be more imperative that a state take action
against a church official both for purposes of restitution and deterrence.
Federal tax liability does not involve the return of monies wrongfully
diverted from a church, nor is there any assurance that penalties for
violation of tax laws will adequately deter church officials from engag-
ing in wrongful activity.
51 See supra note 39. The fact that few exemptions have been revoked draws into question
whether federal tax sanctions, as applied, have a capacity to deter wrongdoing.
52 Conceivably, the retroactive revocation of the exempt status of a church could wipe out
all of its assets. Such a result clearly would seem to be in violation of the first amendment,
even though it can be argued that the federal government is rightfully entitled to collect these
taxes. In Lesavoy Foundation v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1956), the Third Cir-
cuit reversed the Tax Court's retroactive revocation where the revocation would have wiped
out all of the assets of the Foundation.
53 To protest high taxes, over 90% of the adult population of Hardenburgh, New York
became ministers of the Universal Life Church and claimed tax exemptions as clergy mem-
bers. N.Y. Times, July 17, 1977, at 14, col. 3. This tax revolt was aided by the decision in
Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Cal. 1974), involving the
tax-exempt status of the church whose primary activities included ordaining ministers, grant-
ing church charters, and issuing Honorary Doctor of Divinity Degrees. In 1977, the church
claimed to have ordained 6 million ministers in the last 15 years. N.Y. Times, May 29, 1977,
at 37, col. 1. For a "free will offering" of S20, the church whose only creed is "do your own
thing," mails credentials of ministry to anyone requesting them. The government challenged
the organization's exempt status, but the court primarily ignored the issue of fraud, stressed
that the ordinations were a traditional religious activity, and noted that:
Neither this Court, nor any branch of government will consider the merits or falla-
cies of a religion. Nor will the court compare the beliefs, dogmas and practices of a
newly organized religion with those of an older, more established religion .... Were the
court to do so, it would impinge upon the guarantees of the first amendment.
Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States, 372 F. Supp. at 776. The Department of Justice
did not appeal the case because the amount of revenue was small and the case was regarded
as a weak factual vehicle. Schwarz, Liniting Reh'ious Tax Exemptions.- When Should the Church
Render Unto Caesar? 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 50, 62 n.81 (1976). The founder of the church subse-
quently stated that Universal Life Church was deliberately designed to expolit the tax-ex-
empt status of churches to persuade Congress to terminate the tax exemption. "'Mail Order
Ministers," 60 Minutes, C.B.S. Television, September 26, 1976; N.Y. Times, May 29, 1977, at
37, col. I. See also Kurtz, supra note 38, at 305.
54 A deduction will be allowed for contributions to a religious organization so long as the
organization meets the requirements established under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code. See I.R.C. §170(c)(2) (1981).
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III. THE NEED FOR STATE ACTION
In the absence of state intervention, personal tax fraud liability and
community condemnation are the only real deterrents to a church offi-
cial who is contemplating secretly converting church funds to personal
use. These deterrents are usually sufficient to convince most church offi-
cials that misappropriating church funds would not be in their best in-
terests. In conventional churches that have tax exemptions, moreover, a
church official cannot circumvent tax fraud liability by paying income
taxes on converted funds without alerting the church to the misconduct.
By reporting personal "income," a church official would be alerting the
IRS to a change in the church's operation, thereby jeopardizing the
church's tax-exempt status. Subsequent IRS action, in turn, would alert
other church leaders and their congregation to the church official's mis-
conduct. Still, individuals can form churches without tax exemptions
and report their income from church funds to the IRS, but continue to
solicit contributions without informing donors that they are using the
funds for self enrichment. Clearly, there would be a need for a state to
intervene in a fraudulent solicitation scheme.55 '
Yet even in conventional churches, tax fraud and community con-
demnation will not always represent adequate deterrents to fiscal mis-
conduct. By exercising its police power, a state should impose
additional sanctions designed to punish an individual so that the costs of
converting funds to personal use outweigh the benefits.561 States do not
respond to secular corporate embezzlement merely by relying on federal
tax fraud liability. A state should put church leaders on notice that
church looting will not be tolerated.
A state's attorney general or public prosecutor is likely to hesitate to
bring any action against church officials, however, unless the legislature
has clearly defined his or her authority in this area. Moreover, state
enforcement attempts may be complicated because there is no objective
definition of what constitutes an improper use of church funds. On the
55 For a description of fraudulent solicitation schemes involving religious causes, see C.
BAKAL, supra note 4, at 103-18.
56 Of course, the threat of additional penal sanctions may not deter all individuals. For
example, there was the prosecution of the Very Reverend Guido John Carcich, the fund-
raising director of the Pallottine Fathers of Baltimore, a Roman Catholic missionary order.
The Pallotines collected $20 million in contributions through a sophisticated mail campaign
for starving children overseas, but less than 3% of the funds ever reached these children. C.
BAKAL, supra note 4, at 103. Father Carcich pleaded guilty to diverting $2.2 million of the
charitable contributions into 28 secret bank accounts and squandering part of the money on
fellow priests, friends, and relatives. Id. at 104. Under a plea bargaining agreement, Carcich
pleaded guilty to one count of the original 61-count indictment, and the court placed him on
probation for 18 months with the stipulation that he spend a year "ministering to the needs of
prisoners" in the Maryland penal system. Id. For other examples of greedy clergymen who
have attempted to profit by illegal acts, see Weeding Out Clergymen Who Go Astray, supra note 28.
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one hand, it is not uncommon for religious leaders to live lives of luxury,
particularly where their followers view them as prophets.5: 7 On the other
hand, certain religious leaders, being viewed more as trustees and ad-
ministrators, are expected to use church funds for religious purposes
without enriching themselves or third parties. The difference between
the two situations lies in how funds are solicited. If a church, either
through its express representations or past record of expenditures, cre-
ates a reasonable expectation that church funds will not go to enrich
church leaders, then an implied trust as to the use of these funds arises.
Contributors' reasonable expectations and desires, as well as church rep-
resentations, are proper limits on the use of church funds.5 8 Because
states have intervened in church financial affairs on but a few occasions,
however, this approach has not been established in case law.
If state officers are uncertain as to what their role should be in po-
licing church financial affairs, state legislators should consider enacting
a law which expressly grants to a state official the power to bring civil
and criminal actions against church officials who embezzle church
funds.5 9 Any deterrent effect that can be attributed to possible state
sanctions will be ineffective unless there is certainty that state officers
will impose them.6° An explicit statute is necessary to clearly define the
57 Followers of the Divine Light Mission sleep on straw pallets, practice celibacy, abstain
from alcohol and other worldly pleasures, while their leader, Guru Maharij Ji lives regally in
luxurious homes in Denver, Los Angeles, New York, and London and has a fleet of chauffered
Mercedes and Rolls Royce automobiles. C. BAKAL, supra note 4, at 117.
58 One commentator arguing for a contributor's reasonable expectation test stated:
The concern thus becomes more. . . one of misrepresentation than of imposition of
state generated rules of conduct on religious fiduciaries. This approach, in principle,
would involve implying a contract between the donor and church leadership from the
facts surrounding the contribution and enforcing its terms. This would certainly be a
gap-filling process-the gaps might be greater than those we ordinarily fill in contract
law-but the parties' own understanding would still be our guide. This analysis recog-
nizes that religious freedom requires allowing the faithful to support an appropriate lifes-
tyle for a religious leader they view as a divine prophet, but it should not disable the
contributors from seeking redress when the leader solicits contributions for the Asian
poor, yet actually spends the funds on a private tennis court for his son. In that case we
can apply religiously neutral rules to protect the interest of the donor-followers, even
though those rules may be substantially different from traditional trust principles.
Ellman, Driven from the Tribunal Judicial Resolution of Internal Church Disputes, 69 CAL. L. REV.
1378, 1441 (1981).
59 The provision need not create a new offense. Instead, the provision would be enabling
only-granting authority to state officials to bring an action under another criminal statute
or provision relating to charitable trusts. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 9230 (c)(2),( 3 ) (West Supp.
1981) at infra note 64. An enabling provision could therefore avoid any question of vagueness
that could arise if a statute should be drafted to provide that it shall be unlawful for an
individual to "divert religious funds to his own use." See also State v. Miller, 100 Ariz. 288,
413 P.2d 757 (1966).
60 See Andenaes, General Prevention Revisited- Research and Policy Implications, 66 J. CRIM.
L.C. 338, 362 (1975).
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authority of state enforcement officers."' In this sensitive area involving
religious freedom, attorneys general and prosecutors are apt to be keenly
aware of the question of their authority to sue churches.
The sensitivity of state officials to the question of their authority
and the propriety of an action against churches or their leaders is best
illustrated by the suit which the California attorney general's office
dropped against the Worldwide Church of God.62 After the attorney
general filed suit against World Wide Church of God on behalf of six
church members who alleged that church leaders were diverting large
amounts of money for self enrichment, the church launched a successful
petition drive and pressured the state legislature to pass a bill prospec-
tively forbidding such litigation. 3: Ironically, the law authorized the
California attorney general to bring criminal fraud charges or charges
involving misuse of money solicited from the general public." 4 The ef-
(i Of course, legislators could conclude that there is no real need for this type of legislation
if there have been too few complaints registered against churches in the state or nationally to
justify legislation. Legislators may also feel that the burden should be on the church to initi-
ate an action. This presupposes, however, that the church is the real party in interest and has
not been specifically set up to defraud the public.
62 See Worldwide Church of God. Inc. v. California, 623 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1980)
63 Lauter, Are Churches hnder Attack?, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 2, 1981, at 17, col. 3.
(34 The new California law provides:
(a) Except as the Attorney General is empowered to act in the enforcement of the
criminal laws of this state, and except as the Attorney General is expressly empowered by
subdivisions (b), (c) and(d), the Attorney General shall have no powers with respect to
any corporation incorporated or classified as a religious corporation under or pursuant to
this code.
(b) The Attorney General shall have authority to institute an action or proceeding
under Section 803 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to obtain judicial determination that a
corporation is not properly qualified or classified as a religious corporation under the
provisions of this part.
(c) The Attorney General shall have the authority (1) expressly granted with respect
to any subject or matter covered by Section 9660 to 9690, inclusive; (2) to initiate crimi-
nal procedures to prosecute violations of the criminal laws and upon conviction seek
restitution as punishment; and (3) to represent as legal counsel any other agency or de-
partment of the State of California expressly empowered to regulate activities in which
religious corporations, as well as other entities, may engage.
(d) Where property has been solicited and received from the general public, based
on a representation that it would be used for a specific charitable purpose other than
general support of the corporation's activities, and has been used in a manner contrary to
that specific charitable purpose for which the property was solicited, the Attorney Gen-
eral must institute an action to enforce the specific charitable purpose for which the
property was solicited; provided (1) that before bringing such action the Attorney Gen-
eral shall notify the corporation that an action will be brought unless the corporation
takes immediate steps to correct the improper diversion of funds, and (2) that in the
event it becomes impractical or impossible for the corporation to devote the property to
the specified charitable purpose, or that the directors or members of the corporation in
good faith expressly conclude and record in writing that the stated purpose for which the
property was contributed is no longer in accord with the policies of the corporation, then
the directors or members of the corporation may approve or ratify in good faith the use
of such property for the general purposes of the corporation rather than for the specific
purpose for which it was contributed.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 9230 (West Supp. 1982).
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fect of the legislature's restriction of the attorney general's authority was
the ending of all attorney general lawsuits against churches '5 despite the
prospective nature of the restriction and the fact that the state could still
charge church officials with fraud or misuse of solicited funds. Hence,
not only are explicit statutory provisions necessary, but there must be a
clear legislative mandate that provisions be enforced.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE INTERVENTION
It is also important that proposed legislation aimed at the problem
of the misuse of church funds have a solid constitutional basis. Without
this foundation, state legislators may be reluctant to enact a provision.?"
A clear constitutional foundation is more important, however, to attor-
neys general and prosecutors. The prospect of litigating and appealing
cases that are not merely routine matters of determining whether funds
were misappropriated but involve difficult constitutional problems
would discourage anyone from suing churches, even those who are duty-
bound to enforce the law.
Church officials are formidable adversaries armed not only with
constitutional defenses, but also with substantial resources that can be
spent on a trial, or even brought to bear on the case out of court if the
church decides to take its case to the public or the legislature. 7 Reli-
gious defendants have been known to wear down judges and prosecutors
with hundreds of motions, challenges, and objections, and cling tena-
ciously to their righteous beliefs and constitutional objections to the very
end.18 Consequently, it is important that those challenging church offi-
cials in court at least know that their suit does not offend the first
amendment.
65 See supra note 18. The California Deputy Attorney General who handled the World-
wide Church of God case said that church members still come to his office seeking help in
cases where church money is being diverted to private use but no action is being taken upon
these complaints. Lauter, supra note 63 at 17, col. 4.
66 Their reluctance could also stem from a perception that legislation directed at religious
institutions is politically risky. In contrast, local political pressure probably does not con-
strain federal government officials as indicated by the prosecution of federal mail fraud cases
against religious leaders. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); United States v.
Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981).
67 See supra text accompanying note 63. See generally M. LARSON & C. LOWELL, THE
CHURCHES: THEIR RiCHEs, REVENUES, AND IMMUNIrIEs (1969).
68 Defense counsel for religious officials of the Church of Scientology recently remarked,
"They [religious officials] will fight harder, they have more faith and belief in what they're
doing than the average criminal defendant." Lauter, supra note 63, at 22, col. 11. See ifra
note 146.
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A. COMPELLING STATE INTEREST IN PROTECTING CHURCH FUNDS
The Constitution absolutely protects religious beliefs."" The free-
dom to act on one's religious beliefs7°1 is also protected, but such protec-
tion may be overcome by compelling state interests. 7 1 A law imposing
criminal or civil penalties on the performance of acts which conscience
compels pressures the underlying beliefs and infringes the freedom to
believe.7 2 Because we value religious beliefs highly, and because belief
and conduct are often inseparable, the state can forbid religiously moti-
vated action only where it poses "some substantial threat to public
safety, peace or order, ' 73 or where there are competing governmental
interests that are of a higher order and cannot accomodate the religious
practice.74 If a court should find a first amendment free exercise viola-
tion by a state government that pursues the goal of protection of church
(9 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
70 See supra note 16.
71 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398. 406 (1963).
72 One commentator recognized that there is not sharp distinction between religious be-
liefs and practices:
The violation of a man's religion or conscience often works an exceptional harm to
him which, unless justified by the most stringent social needs, constitutes a moral wrong
in and of itself, far more than would the impairment of his freedoms of speech, press or
assembly. The argument is not merely that avoiding compulsion of a man's conscience
produces the greatest good for the greatest number, but that such compulsion is itself
unfair to the individual concerned. The moral condemnation implicit in the threat of
criminal sanctions is likely to be very painful to one motivated by belief. Futhermore,
the cost to a principled individual of failing to do his moral duty is generally severe, in
terms of supernatural sanction or the loss of moral self-respect. In the face of these costs,
the individual's refusal to obey the law may be inevitable, and therefore in some perhaps
unusual sense of the word, involuntary.
J. Clark, Guidelinesfor the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARv. L. REv. 327, 337 (1969).
73 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). See Heffron v. Int'l Society for Krishna
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (state's interest in crowd control at fair sufficiently com-
pelling to restrict religious solicitation to booths); United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439
(D.D.C 1968) (government's interest in health and safety justifies criminal prosecution of
members of Neo-American Church which embraced principle that marijuana and LSD are
sacramental foods); M.I. v. A.I., 435 N.Y.S. 2d 928 (Fam. Ct. 1981) (state's interest that mem-
ber of ISKCON support his wife and child sufficiently compelling and takes precedent over
religious practice); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942) (compel-
ling state interest in safety justified prohibition against snake handling as a religious practice).
74 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). See United States v. Huss, 482 F.2d 38
(2d Cir. 1973) (a refusal based on religious grounds to testify at a Grand Jury proceeding was
subordinated to the compelling state interest of insuring the smooth functioning of the Grand
Jury so vital to the criminal justice system); U.S. v. Reiss, 478 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1973) (main-
tenance of any army found to be compelling state interest requiring defendant to register with
the military despite a religious objection); International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. City of New York, 501 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (government interest in protec-
tion of United Nations Headquarters outweighed religious society's interest in soliciting on
adjacent sidewalks); Varga v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 1113 (D.D.C. 1979), aj'd without
opinion, 618 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1980) (continued existence of the Social Security system found
to be compelling interest requiring plantiff to make tax contributions despite religious
objection).
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assets from abuse, the state would have to demonstrate a compelling
state interest.
Assuming arguendo that a state's imposition of sanctions against reli-
gious leaders for diverting funds infringes religious rights, the state can
demonstrate a compelling state interest in combating fraud and corrup-
tion involving church monies. For example, courts on several occasions
have discussed a compelling interest in preventing or punishing fraud in
connection with the solicitation of funds.75 Recently, the Second Circuit
in International Sociey for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber7 6 held that a
state has a compelling interest in preventing fraudulent religious solici-
tation of funds. If a state can demonstrate a compelling interest in
preventing or punishing fraud in connection with the collection of
funds, then by the same logic, it can demonstrate a compelling interest
in preventing or punishing the unlawful conversion of those funds after
religious organizations have collected them.
7 7
The state has a duty to protect churches from theft. The state also
has an interest in protecting citizens, who have donated funds with the
reasonable expectation that they be used for religious purposes, from the
subsequent diversion of those funds. Of course, preserving religious as-
sets designated for religious purposes as a compelling state interest, in
spirit at least, appears to violate the principle of separation of church
and state. A state's interest must be secular or it will violate the estab-
lishment clause of the first amendment.7 8 However, the state's interest
need not be drawn so narrowly and characterized as having a religious
purpose; 79 a state has a much broader interest in protecting the order
75 E.g., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 101
S.Ct. 2559, 2568 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 636-37 (1980); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940); International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 444 (2d Cir. 1981).
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to actually hold that a state has a compelling
interest in protecting its citizens from fraudulent religious solicitations. In Larson v. Valente,
102 S. Ct. 1673, 1685 (1982), the Court was willing only to assume arguendo that a Minnesota
law aimed at preventing fraudulent religious solicitations was addressed to a sufficiently com-
pelling governmental interest.
76 650 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1981).
77 Arguably, protection of third parties, i.e., the church, its members and contributors,
would be a sufficient compelling state interest. See, e.g., West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nett, 319 U.S. 624, 630 (1943); Clark, Guidelines/or the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. Riv.
327, 361 (1969); Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing
Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350, 373-75 (1980).
78 See Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653 (1980); Roemer v.
Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U.S. 736, 748 (1976); Committee for Public Education v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772-73 (1973). The establishment clause prohibits government spon-
sorship of religion which requires that the government neither aid nor formally establish a
religion.
79 Just because a government action has a religious purpose does not mean that it cannot
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and welfare of its citizens.
B. LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS ANALYSIS
The state must also show that it uses the least restrictive means to
achieve its ends.8 0 In Barber, New York attempted to prevent fraud at its
state fair by forbidding peripatetic solicitations. New York enacted a
"booth rule" requiring solicitation of funds at state fairs to be conducted
from a booth, where solicitations could be supervised, which effectively
prevented members of the International Society for Krishna Conscious-
ness from engaging in the religious ritual of sankirtan. This practice
requires roving members to approach the uninitiated, to inform them of
the precepts of the religion, and to seek donations. The court held that
the booth rule was overly broad because it unduly restricted nonfraudu-
lent solicitations.8 1 The court considered the use of the penal law to be a
better response to the problem of fraud 82 because it punishes undesir-
able conduct after it occurs. Generally, a prophylactic rule interferes
with free exercise rights and is therefore invalid because it limits both
activity that threatens important social interests as well as activity that
does not.
83
Once fraudulent conduct occurs, therefore, the imposition of sanc-
also have a secular purpose sufficient to satisfy the secular requirement of the establishment
clause test. Gilfillian v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1980), cet. denied, 451 U.S.
987 (1981).
80 See e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec. Div. 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963). Less restrictive alternatives must be adequate to achieve
a state's compelling interest, a requirement that the Supreme Court emphasized in Heffron v.
ISKCON, 452 U.S. 640, (1981); the Court disagreed with the Minnesota Supreme Court that
a booth rule at state fairs was an unnecessary regulation because of the availability of less
restrictive means to control crowds, such as penalizing disorder, limiting the number of solici-
tors, or putting restrictions on the movement of ISKCON's representatives. There would be a
much larger threat to the state's interest in crowd control if all other religious, nonreligious,
and noncommercial organizations could move freely about the fairground distributing litera-
ture and soliciting funds, according to the Court, and the alternative means that the Minne-
sota Supreme Court suggested would not adequately deal with the problem of this
hypothetical threat. Id at 2567.
81 International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 446-47 (2d
Cir. 1981).
82 Id. The court stated: "[w]e find it constitutionally preferable to limit the application of
harsh legal sanctions to only those narrow activities that deserve the law's opprobrium-
fraudulent solicitations." Id at 447.
83 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 306 (1940); Int'l Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430 (2d Cir.
1981); International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Bowen,
600 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Silberman, 464 F. Supp. 866 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
But see Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981); In-
ternational Society for Krishna Consciousness v. City of New York, 501 F. Supp. 684
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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tions no longer raises a question of the availability of less restrictive
means to implement the governmental purpose. However, there is a risk
that the state will intervene in religious affairs when no fraud is in-
volved. In order to avoid being declared unconstitutional, state intru-
sion into the financial affairs of churches must be limited by narrowly
defining the circumstances that must be present before the government
can intervene.
C. LIMITED INTERVENTION
Because there is an interrelationship between sincerely held reli-
gious beliefs and church finances,8 4 the government cannot interfere
with the financial decision-making process of church officials unless: (1)
a constitutionally permissible, categorical exception is established, or (2)
no vital link between religious beliefs and financial activities is demon-
strated.85' The categorical exception must be susceptible of being de-
fined as an area that does not involve a question that church officials
properly should resolve. This approach involves the separation of
purely secular matters from ecclesiastical matters. The Supreme Court
endorsed this kind of approach in the "neutral principles" doctrine ap-
plied in civil actions involving church property disputes.8 8
Church property dispute resolution by civil courts is analogous to
state intervention in church financial matters. When a church breaks
into factions or a local church withdraws from a denomination, a dis-
pute often arises as to which faction of the formerly united church owns
or controls the church property. After separating from the general
church, the local church usually asserts control over the property and
the general church claims that the property has been wrongfully taken.
84 A church official who secretly diverts church funds to his Swiss bank account will have
great difficulty demonstrating this nexus. Atorney General Enforcement, supra note 18, at 1314.
85 Id. Courts have used an alternative method to sever the link between belief and con-
duct by making an inquiry into a claimant's sincerity in holding certain religious beliefs. In
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965), the Court assumed that courts could test
the sincerity of one seeking a conscientious objection exemption, albeit Seeger was a case of
statutory interpretation involving § 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of
1948, 50 U.S.C. App. § 4560) (1958). Courts do not always demand that individuals demon-
strate the sincerity of their religious beliefs, but often an inquiry into a claimant's sincerity is a
necessary prerequisite to triggering constitutional safeguards. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd.,
Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) (state's denial of unemployment compensation
benefits to petitioner violated first amendment because the petitioner, after being transferred
to a munitions plant, terminated his work because of an honest conviction that such work was
forbidden by his religion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972) (Amish convincingly
demonstrated the sincerity of their beliefs that high school attendance was contrary to the
Amish religion and their salvation). Accord Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1981);
Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1003 (1974); Frank v.
State, 604 F.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
86 See infra text accompanying notes 94-98.
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In much the same way, a state's attorney general or prosecutor alleges
that a church official has unlawfully diverted church monies to an im-
proper use or purpose. In neither situation can there be a complete sep-
aration of church and state because a secular court must resolve the
controversy unless the Constitution forecloses the court's action. Under
certain circumstances, however, a civil court cannot entertain a church
dispute. 7 Consequently, one could anticipate that the principles pre-
cluding secular court intervention in these instances equally apply to
state actions and foreclose state intervention in certain circumstances
where church funds have been diverted from religious uses.
The Supreme Court in Watson v. Jones88 established a rule of nonin-
terference with church doctrine in church property disputes. A court
was to defer completely to decisions of the internal church authority
once the court had determined the seat of authority,8 9 thereby avoiding
a judicial inquiry into the underlying doctrinal controversy involved in
the dispute.9 0 The landmark Supreme Court decision on church prop-
erty disputes, Presbyterian Church v. May Elizabeth Blue Hill Memorial Pres-
byterian Church,91 elevated Watson's rule of noninterference with church
doctrine to a constitutional level. In Presbyterian Church, two Georgia
congregations voted to disaffiliate themselves from the Presbyterian
Church of the United States because of its liberal stand on such matters
as the ordination of women as ministers, civil disobedience, and the Vi-
etnam War.92 In the ensuing dispute over property, the Supreme Court
recognized that religious freedom precludes civil courts from determin-
ing ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving property dis-
putes.93 Nonetheless, the Court reaffirmed the power of courts to decide
87 See infra text accompanying note 93.
88 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
89 In deciding church disputes, courts distinguish between congregational churches and
hierarchical churches. See supra note 31. The characterization of a church as congregational
or hierarchical may have an impact on the outcome of a suit. For example, ordinary princi-
ples governing secular voluntary associations apply to congregational churches, and therefore
the will of the majority controls congregational church property, although power to control
church property can also be vested in a governing body of trustees or church officials in a
congregational church. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 725. The decision of the
highest church judicature is binding upon hierarchical churches. Id. at 727.
90 The policy is justified by the assumption that church members fully submit to desig-
nated church authority. The Court in Watson emphasized that church members impliedly
consent to church government; the theoretical basis for the decision was contractual. An
implied contract exists between a member and his local church in congregational churches;
an implied contract to be governed also arises when an individual or church unites itself with
a hierarchical body. Id at 729.
91 393 U.S. 440 (1969), remandedsub nom. Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Presby-
terian Church, 224 Ga. 61, 159 S.E.2d 690 (1968).
92 393 U.S. at 442 n.l.
93 393 U.S. at 447. The Court has also held unconstitutional judicial review of internal
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church property disputes so long as they could do so without resolving
underlying doctrinal controversies. Courts are to resolve church prop-
erty disputes by invoking "neutral principles" of law.11
4
The neutral principles approach, as recently enunciated in Jones v.
Wof,95 permits a court to examine the deeds, the corporate charter,
state statutes, and provisions of the church's constitution to determine
ownership and control of church property.!"! So long as a neutral princi-
ples inquiry does not involve a doctrinal interpretation of documents,
' 7
a court may rely on secular concepts in trust and property law which do
not implicate forbidden religious questions."8 Consequently, state in-
volvement in the internal affairs of religious organizations is not consti-
tutionally prohibited, at least when the dispute is between two church
adversaries.
A neutral principles approach can be utilized in state intervention
to prevent violation of laws relating to charitable trusts or nonprofit cor-
porations and applying to religious organizations. 9 State intervention
would be limited only where the relationship between religious belief
and church finances cannot be severed. For example, conditions at-
tached to the use and control of church property or funds might subject
them to an express trust when an individual grants property to a church.
The conditions attached to a gift might go so far as to attempt to limit
doctrinal change, or might limit the use of the trust for a particular
religious purpose. The condition would be judicially enforceable only if
a court would not be required to consider doctrinal matters.10 0 Thus, if
church decisions for arbitrariness. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696 (1976).
94 The term "neutral principles" was first used in Presbyterian, 393 U.S. at 449, and subse-
quently approved in a per curiam opinion in Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the
Churches of God v. Church of God of Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367 (1970).
95 443 U.S. 595 (1979). Jones emphasized the dangers of church-state entanglement, but
equally applicable is the free exercise clause. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hill Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 448-50; Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathe-
dral, 344 U.S. 94, 107-08, 120-21 (1952).
96 443 U.S. at 600-01.
97 Id at 604.
98 Id. at 603.
99 In Synanon Foundation, Inc. v. California, 444 U.S. 1307 (1979) (Rehnquist, Circuit
Justice), Justice Rehnquist approved the use of a neutral principles approach in cases where
the state intervenes in church affairs through its attorney general. Id at 1308. Prior to this, a
neutral principles approach had been used only in the context of intra-church property
disputes.
100 See Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God of
Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. at 369 n.2. (Brennan, J., concurring). In Presbyterian, Justice
Harlan made a separate statement about express trusts. He considered enforceable express
trusts that attach conditions limiting doctrinal change. However, the examples that Justice
Harlan used involved conditions that would not involve a court in doctrinal inquiry, e.g., a
condition stating that the church never ordain women. 393 U.S. at 452. In Watson, the Court
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a state legislature were to permit its attorney general to police the use of
church funds that have been designated by express trusts for specific
uses, the scope of attorney general enforcement would be limited to the
kinds of trusts where the secular law of property and trusts could be
applied neutrally.
Absent a specific trust, a state enforcement proceeding that seeks to
enjoin church expenditures, which an attorney general has determined
are not being made to advance religious purposes and therefore are not
in accord with the corporate purpose of the religious organization, im-
permissibly intrudes into the financial decision-making of church offi-
cials. Unless the link between belief and financial activities can be
severed, neither a state nor a civil court can dictate to a church how to
spend its money. Although the inquiry is not strictly one involving a
determination of church doctrine, a court would be required to examine
the religious beliefs of church officials with regard to expenditures made
for religious purposes.' 0 ' Characterizing expenditures as religious, in
this context, is an ecclesiastical matter
0 2 beyond the power of courts.'0 3
in dicta recognized that the law of secular charities should apply when church property is
subject to an express trust; a trust created for "the teaching, support or spread of some specific
form of religious doctrine or belief" is enforceable. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 722. The judiciary
could engage in a doctrinal inquiry to determine trustee adherence to the trust's objectives.
Id at 723-24. But in light of modern cases, any doctrinal inquiry of this kind would be
absolutely prohibited.
101 The examination of an individual's religious beliefs is permissible only in the context of
determining if beliefs are sincerely held. See supra note 85.
102 See supra note I. One commentator has discussed how religious freedom would be im-
paired if the state were to have a general role in deciding which church expenditures could
properly be labelled religious and therefore permitted by the church's corporate charter. At-
torne General Enforcement, supra note 18, at 1313-25. See also New York v. Cathedral Academy
434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977) ("The prospect of church and state litigating in court about what
does or does not have religious meaning touches the very core of the constitutional guarantee
against religious establishment .... ").
103 Church officials who devote considerable assets to secular projects and consequently
violate a so-called general religious trust are still engaging in activities that benefit the
church, unless there is mismanagement and waste. So long as these secular projects are not
secretive and do not inure to the benefit of private individuals, the government should not
regulate church expenditures.
In other contexts, however, the government retains the right to divide the world into the
secular and religious. The Supreme Court has been reluctant to announce a constitutional
definition of religion, but pursuant to an expansive definition of religion, continues to make
threshold determinations of whether certain beliefs and practices are religious. See Note, To-
ward a Constitutional Defiion of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1056 (1978). For example, in
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Supreme Court in ruling that Wisconsin could
not require members of the Amish Church to send their children to public school after the
eighth grade determined that certain Amish practices were religious. The Court found that
the Amish life style, eductional practices and a refusal to submit their children to further
secular education were religious in nature. Certain factors were important to the Court's
determination among which were the existence of beliefs (1) shared by an organized group;
(2) related to theocratic principles; (3) pervading and regulating their daily lives; and (4)
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Thus, when a church commits funds to construct a hospital, for exam-
ple, an attorney general or a judge is not the proper party to determine
whether the expenditure is made pursuant to a religious purpose or is
entirely dedicated to a secular undertaking.
0 4
Still, an exception can be carved from the general rule that the
government cannot dictate to a religious organization how to spend its
funds. This exception would be carved out in the public interest,,0 5 but
the line drawing must be narrowed so that the state does not go beyond
the boundaries of the public interest and impermissibly regulate what
are essentially ecclesiastical matters properly left to the discretion of
church officials. According to this standard, limiting state intervention
to those situations where individuals fraudulently divert funds to benefit
private individuals sufficiently narrows state intrusion. The public in-
terest includes the interests of church contributors and churches in not
having funds wrongfully taken; a state proceeding against church offi-
cials who divert these funds protects the public interest and goes no
further.
Moreover, the link between belief and financial activity can be sev-
ered in most cases. Even Justice Jackson, who dissented in UnitedStates v.
Ballard06 because he thought that the court had not gone far enough in
prohibiting inquiries into religious fraud,' 0 7 noted that a purely secular
fraud such as using for private purposes money solicited for building
existing for a substantial period of time. Id at 215-17. Which if any of these factors deter-
mines the presence of a religion or a religious belief was not spelled out in the decision, and
the process of determining whether an activity is religious remains unclear.
A notable case involving a threshold determination is United States v. Kuch, 288 F.
Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968), which involved the prosecution of a leader of the Neo-American
Church for a drug charge. The organization consisted of 20,000 members who considered
psychedelic drugs to be sacramental food. The defendant moved to dismiss the violation of
her free exercise rights, but the court concluded that it could not avoid the subtle and difficult
inquiry into the definition of religion. The court held that the organization was not a religion
because the record presented "[no] solid evidence of a belief in a supreme being, a religious
disciple, a ritual, or tenets to guide one's daily existence." Id at 444. The secular nature of
the organization was revealed in the church "catechism" ("we have the right to practice our
religion, even if we are a bunch of filthy drunken bums"), a church key (a bottle opener),
official songs ("Puff, the Magic Dragon" and "Row, Row, Row Your Boat"), an order of
bishops ("Boo Hoos"), and a solemn motto ("Victory Over Horseshit"). Id. at 443-44. But cf.
People v. Woody, 61 Cal.2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (California could not
ban the use of hallucinogenic peyote by the Navajo Indians because the belief in the drug as a
sacramental symbol was bona fide).
104 Even if appropriate criteria could be developed to make such a determination, intru-
sions by the state into the financial affairs of a church for the sole purpose of determining the
propriety of church expenditures would result in an impermissible continuing relationship
between church and state. See ira text accompanying notes 114-21, 127.
105 See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
106 322 U.S. 78, 92 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
107 Justice Jackson did not specifically use the terms "religious fraud" or "secular fraud"
but the dichotomy can be inferred from his opinion. Id
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churches or other religious purposes could be prosecuted because the
prosecution would not involve the testing of beliefs.10 8 In Ballard, de-
fendants were charged with mail fraud in connection with the solicita-
tion of funds for the "I am" religious movement. They represented that
they had been selected as "divine messengers" with powers to heal dis-
eases, including some classified as incurable. The Supreme Court held
that the district court properly withdrew the issue of the truth of the
defendants' religious beliefs from the jury, stating that the Constitution
forecloses any inquiry into the truth or falsity of the religious beliefs. 10 9
While holding that a court could not inquire into "religious frauds,"
however, the Court did not specifically rule on whether a court could
inquire into whether the defendant sincerely held the belief, leaving this
issue to later cases. I 10 Justice Jackson dissented from the remanding of
the case to the circuit court because he argued that the testing of one's
sincerity was not materially different from a testing of the belief itself. " I
An inquiry into whether a church official has diverted church funds
to benefit private individuals would not demand from a court an uncon-
stitutional testing of religious beliefs. As trust law can be used to sever
the link in church property disputes, so could criminal or civil statutory
provisions be used in a neutral principles approach to sever the link be-
tween church officials' religious beliefs and their use of church funds.
In response to state intervention, church officials could assert that
their religious beliefs include a belief in diverting funds to themselves or,
in the spirit of religious giving, to family or friends. Dispensing church
108 Id at 95. The dichotomy between secular fraud and religious fraud is not always com-
pletely clear. In Hansel v. Purnell, I F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1924),cert. denied, 266 U.S. 617 (1924),
a leader of a religious colony fraudulently induced a family to transfer all of their property to
the religious organization. The leader allegedly seduced young female members of the col-
ony, and the court held that he could not shield himself from civil liability. The court stated:
This action is not and does not purport to be an attack upon a religious faith, but,
on the contrary, an attack upon an attempt to prostitute that faith to irreligious and base
purposes through the instrumentality of a so-called religious society, ostensibly organized
for the furtherance of the faith, but in fact organized under guise of religion for wicked,
lewd, licentious, and unlawful purposes. This, of course, does not mean that any individ-
ual may be deprived of his constitutional right to worship God in accordance with the
dictates of his conscience, nor that a court will assume to determine the truth or error of
any religious creed or dogma; but it does mean that no individual, or group of individu-
als, will be permitted to deceive and defraud others through and by false and fraudulent
representations made under color of religion, no matter what that religion may be or
under color of any other lawful purpose.
Id at 270.
109 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, included the following quote from Watson in
his opinion: "The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the
establishment of no sect." Id at 86 (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728
(1872)). See general/y Heins, "Other People's Faiths'" The Scientology Litigation and thejustiiab/li
oReigious Fraud, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 153 (1981).
110 See supra note 85.
111 322 U.S. at 92-95.
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assets to enrich private parties pursuant to a religious tenet or belief
could not be proscribed by a state so long as there was full disclosure to
church members and to all those who entered into a trust relationship
with church trustees." 2 Disclosure would be an essential requirement
for receiving donations. The religious organization would not be enti-
tled to a tax exemption nor would religious donations be tax deductible.
In this way, a state is not preventing anyone from exercising his religious
beliefs. Officials of this profit-generating religious organization merely
would be charged with a duty to disclose their pecuniary interest in
church finances if and when their interest clearly exceeds any reasonable
compensation for services rendered. A failure to disclose' 13 would con-
stitute fraud, not a religious fraud as was alleged in Ballard, but a secular
fraud as Justice Jackson pointed out in his dissent.' 14
The compelling state interest-neutral principles-secular fraud
approach attempts to ensure that state action will not infringe upon the
first amendment rights of church officials while simultaneously enabling
the state to ensure that church officials will not be able to infringe upon
the rights of others with impunity. In this way, the state can protect
donors' reasonable expectations concerning the use of their money.
D. THE RISK OF DENOMINATIONAL DISCRIMINATION AND
HARRASSMENT
One primary drawback exists to giving state enforcement officials
the power to bring criminal and civil actions against church officials.
There is a risk that enforcement officials will use their power of
prosecutorial discretion to exempt religious leaders of certain denomina-
112 There is no state interest in preventing religious organizations from making gifts of
their assets when there is no fraud or other wrongdoing.
113 Church officials would have to disclose their intention to use the funds for their per-
sonal enrichment prior to their acceptance of the funds. Funds previously solicited could not
be diverted because no disclosure preceded the receipt of monies; their diversion would be in
direct opposition to the reasonable expectation of the contributing public that these funds are
to be used for religious or charitable purposes or for the benefit of the church. See Ellman,
supra note 58, at 1440-43. One can also apply this principle to a hypothetical situation where
previously solicited money has been used to develop church-run businesses that produce in-
come which officials now wish to divert to their own use. The only colorable claim to in-
fringement of religious liberty would be that church doctrinal change as to the use of funds
previously solicited is henceforth foreclosed. The public interest would have to come into
play at this point and a court would have to balance the opposing interests.
In response to a disclosure requirement, church officials could also assert that they have
religious beliefs in making secret personal gifts. But as Chief Justice Burger stated in Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972), although a determination of what is a religious
belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection presents a delicate question, "the very
concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on
matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests."
114 See supra text accompanying notes 106-08.
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tions or religious faiths from state sanctions while charging leaders of
other denominations or religions with violations of the law.
The establishment clause commands that the government cannot
prefer one religion or denomination over another. The Supreme Court
reaffirmed this principle in Larson v. Valente" ' where the Court struck
down a Minnesota charitable solicitation statute which exempted from
its registration and reporting requirements only those religious organiza-
tions receiving more than fifty per cent of their funds from members or
affiliated organizations. The Court found that the fifty percent rule
granted denominational preferences, and the rule could not be justified
by the state's unsupported contentions that church members will super-
vise and control their religious organization and protect the public from
abusive solicitations simply because they contribute more than half of
the organization's income. 1 6 Justice Brennan, writing for a divided
Court," 7 noted that a "risk of politicizing religion" inheres in legislation
like the fifty per cent rule, and the legislative history of the Minnesota
statute revealed that legislators wanted to exempt the Roman Catholic
archdiocese from the reporting requirements but did not want to ex-
empt certain other religious organizations." 8 Because the Roman Cath-
olic Church is funded primarily through its members while less well-
established churches like Reverend Sun Myung Moon's Unification
Church depend heavily upon publicly solicited contributions, the re-
porting requirement established unconstitutional denominational
preferences.
Unlike Minnesota's fifty per cent rule, a statute which focuses on
the problem of church looting is likely to be facially neutral. But in-
stead of legislators drawing denominational lines, enforcement officials
can apply the law in a discriminatory manner. Discrimination could
easily arise, for example, if enforcement officials choose not to prosecute
or sue certain church leaders after determining that limited
prosecutorial resources are no match for those resources, both political
and financial, which certain religious leaders can mobilize through a
very powerful religious organization. An argument could be made that
the law is merely having a disparate impact and is constitutionally per-
missible because secular criteria are being used to arrive at a decision
whether to sue or prosecute. 19 However, this argument is very weak in
115 102 S. Ct. 1673 (1982).
116 Id at 1685-86.
117 ChiefJustice Burger and Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, and White dissented on stand-
ing grounds; Justices Rehnquist and White also dissented on the merits.
118 Id at 1688.
119 See id. at 1684 n.23; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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the context of prosecutorial discretion because there is too great a risk
that so-called secular criteria are being used to mask the religious prefer-
ences of prosecuting officials.
Although there will probably be too few prosecutions of religious
leaders to establish a pattern of religious discrimination on the part of
state enforcement officials, it is important that state officials avoid dis-
criminating among religions in applying the criminal law.
V. DETECTING FiSCAL. ABUSE: ENTANGLEMENT
State intrusions into church financial affairs raise an additional
constitutional issue. Because an excessive and enduring entanglement
between church and state would result, the government will not be able
to monitor the financial affairs of religious organizations on a continuing
basis. The excessive entanglement test as refined in Lemon v. Kurtzman '
2 0
and Tilton v. Richardson '2 limits the ability of the state and federal gov-
ernments to detect fiscal wrongdoing in churches. In effect, the first
amendment will always stand as a major obstacle to the government's
goal of protecting the public from fraud and corruption occurring in
connection with church funds. '
22
At issue in Lemon were parochial school aid programs designed to
reimburse nonpublic schools or supplement nonpublic school teachers'
salaries for secular instruction. The Court applied a tripartite test: (1)
the purpose must be secular; (2) the primary effect must not advance or
inhibit religion; and (3) an excessive government entanglement must not
result.12-3 The states' programs were invalid under the third prong of the
test because a "comprehensive, discriminating and continuing surveil-
lance" would be required to ensure that the schools obeyed restrictions
against teaching religious doctrine. '2 4 An "intimate and continuing re-
lationship between church and state" is unconstitutional.
25
The same test was applied in Ti/ton v. Richardson where the Court
upheld one-time federal grants to church-related colleges for the con-
struction of buildings to be used only for secular education. In applying
the third prong of the test enunciated in Lemon, the Court cited factors
that lead to excessive entanglement: a continuing financial relationship
between government and a religious organization, annual audits of the
organization's expenditures, and government analysis of expenditures to
120 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
121 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
122 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
123 403 U.S. at 612-13, quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
124 403 U.S. at 619.
125 Id. at 621-22.
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determine which were religious and which were secular.' 2 6 No one fac-
tor is deemed controlling, 27 but the absence of all three in Tilton re-
sulted in the upholding of the federal grants. Constant government
surveillance of church expenditures, according to both the Lemon and
Tilton criteria, is unconstitutional.
One indicator of the unconstitutional nature of continued surveil-
lance is the exemption granted to tax-exempt religious organizations
from filing annual information returns under the Internal Revenue
Code. -'28 A tax-exempt church has a duty to notify immediately the IRS
of any changes in their character, operation, or purpose that could result
in a change in its exempt status.' 29 The church, however, need not file
Form 990, an annual informational return stating, inter alia, items of
gross income, receipts and disbursements, and the names of contributors
and employees. In addition, Section 7605(c) protects churches from un-
reasonable audits. 30 Although the existence of this exemption is not
conclusive in regard to the constitutionality of annual reporting require-
ments, there seems to be an implicit recognition that the gathering of
information by the Service involves some degree of forbidden entangle-
ment. In Walz v. Tax Commission,' 3 ' the landmark case where the words
"excessive entanglement" first appeared, the Court expressed a concern
that the elimination of a tax exemption itself would "involve extensive
state investigation into church operations and finances"'13 and "entan-
gle the government in difficult classification of what is or is not reli-
gious.' 33 Government surveillance is, at the very least, suspect.
Lacking an ability to monitor church finances on a continuing ba-
sis, the government does not have the kind of access to church financial
126 403 U.S. at 688.
127 Id.
128 I.R.C. § 6033(2)(A)(i). See also § 6001.
129 TREAs. REG;. §1.6033-1(h)(1).
130 I.R.C. § 7605(c). Section 7605(c) affords protection to churches against certain IRS
audits in conjunction with an examination for unrelated business income, but does not re-
strict the scope ofexamination with respect to other issues for determination by the IRS when
investigating an exempt organization. Section 7605(b) expressly permits examination of the
religious activities of a church to the extent necessary to determine its entitlement to a tax
exemption. United States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096 (1981).
13 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
132 Id. at 691 (Brennan, J., concurring).
133 Id at 698 (Harlan, J., separate opinion). In concluding that a tax exemption resulted
in less entanglement with religion than taxation, the Court did not say that a tax exemption
was required. The entanglement test is one of degree. Id. at 674. An argument can be made
that there is a reasonable limit of the kind and amount of information obtained for tax col-
lecting purposes, and therefore taxation of church property would not lead to unconstitu-
tional entanglement. See Note, The Internal Revenue Service as a Monitor oChurch Institutions: The
Excessive Entanglement Problem, 45 FORDHAM L. R -v. 929, 946-47 (1977). Whereas the filing of
information returns limits entanglement, surveillance of church financial affairs imposes no
limitation on the information that can be sought. Id
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records that it has with secular corporate books of account. Yet church
financial information is not entirely beyond state scrutiny and is open to
inspection where the government has reason to believe that the church is
no longer entitled to a tax exemption or suspects fraud, corruption, or
other illegality. Once state officers have cause to suspect fraud or cor-
ruption in the church, a properly narrowed summons1 3 4 could be issued
to obtain necessary information from church records. A state could take
action against church officials when church members 3 5 complain that
church officials are flagrantly looting funds or causing the church to buy
expensive items such as a yacht or Rolls-Royce automobile'3t  that bene-
fit only church officials. Church leaders basking in luxury should raise
suspicions, at least, in those churches where church leaders are expected
not to unduly profit from religious service.'
3 7
In addition to citizen complaints, state attorneys general have indi-
rect access to information relating to church finances. Under section
6104(c) of the Internal Revenue Code entitled "Publication to State Of-
ficials," the IRS is to notify the appropriate state attorney general if a
section 501 (c) (3) organization is denied exempt status, or acts in a man-
ner inconsistent with its exempt purposes. 38 The IRS must make its
records of a section 501 (c) (3) organization available when relevant to a
134 A properly narrowed summons does not necessarily mean that state intrusion into
church affairs will not seem severe. On July 8, 1977, more than 150 FBI agents and other
government personnel entered three facilities of the Church of Scientology in Los Angeles and
Washington D.C. The warrants identified 162 items and classes of items to be seized based
upon an affidavit of a former Scientology official who testified with respect to thefts of gov-
ernment documents from the Department of Justice which Scientology members had com-
mitted in 1975. Nearly 50,000 documents were seized in the course of 23 hours of the search.
The legality of the execution of the warrants was established after extensive litigation. In re
Search Warrant Dated July 4, 1977, 436 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1977), rev'd, 572 F.2d 321
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nor., Founding Church of Scientology v. United -States, 435
U.S. 925 (1978); In re Search Warrant Dated July 4, 1977, 667 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See
also United States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Grayson
County State Bank, 656 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Miller, 609 F.2d 336 (8th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Freedom Church, 613 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v.
Coates, 526 F. Supp. 248 (E.D. Cal. 1981).
135 In Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d 562, 565 (8th Cir. 1981), ar'd, 102 S.Ct. 1673 (1982), the
court indicated that church members may have opportunities to uncover fiscal fraud in
churches whereas the general public is not in a very good position to discover this kind of
illicit activity.
136 Hakeem Abdul Rasheed, founder of the Church of Hakeem, was charged with mail
fraud in soliciting religious funds, but not before the Internal Revenue Service seized the
assets of the Church of Hakeem, which included a S900,000 yacht and a $100,000 Rolls-
Royce. United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 846 (9th Cir. 1981).
137 This does not mean that church leaders must keep faith with a vow of poverty or live as
monks. But there is a reasonable expectation that donations for religious causes should not
make religious leaders wealthy where leaders are acting as trustees and administrators. Still,
a lavish lifestyle is not prima facie contrary to donors' reasonable expectations. See Ellman,
supra note 58, at 1440-43.
138 I.R.C. § 6104(c).
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determination under state law. 13'9 Of course, the attorney general also
has access to church financial information generated in the course of a
state's own investigation of church tax liability or exemptions.
Despite these sources, church officials effectively can keep church
financial information from public scrutiny and conceal their misuse of
church funds until an outward manifestion of their wrongdoing surfaces.
Religious freedom has its costs.
140
VI. ARRESTING THE STATE'S ATTENTION
Most people would probably agree that the state should not inter-
fere in church affairs. But the concern here is with bona fide religious
organizations. Increasingly, there are reports of churches being founded
as vehicles to enrich private individuals in the form of tax savings 14' or
profits generated from fraudulent solicitations, 142 although the extent of
the problem is not known. 143 The government should discourage the
misuse of churches.
Yet churches formed to act as cloaks to hide fraud and corruption
are not so easily separated from bona fide churches. Government in-
volvement in church financial affairs gives rise to fears that conventional
churches will become vulnerable to state attacks. 144 For example, where
do reasonable compensation and fringe benefits end and corruption be-
gin? Clearly, prosecutions or civil actions would be appropriate only in
blatant cases of abuse where intent to defraud can be proven. Still, the
fear that the government is intruding into a sphere of sovereignty where
it does not belong can cause considerable resistance to state legislation
and enforcement proceedings.
Where churches pressure a legislature not to act in this area, there
may be insufficient public interest in the goal of preventing church cor-
139 Id § 6104(c)(1)(C).
140 Justice Jackson said that "the price of freedom of religion ... is that we must put up
with, and even pay for, a good deal of rubbish." United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 95
(1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
141 Setting up churches as tax avoidance devices rarely succeeds because the IRS denies the
"church" tax-exempt status because the "church" cannot establish that net earnings have not
inured to the benefit of private individuals. See, e.g., Basic Bible Church v. Commissioner, 74
T.C. 846 (1980); Bubbling Well Church of Universal Love, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 531
(1980).
142 E.g., United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 846 (9th Cir. 1981).
143 One barometer of the religious solicitation problem may be the report by the Philan-
thropic Advisory Service of the Better Business Bureau, which once received only a few letters
a year concerning religious fundraising, stating that half of the 150,000 inquiries it receives
yearly involve church-related charities. Weeding Out Clergymen Who Go Astray, supra note 28, at
63. See general4y Johansen & Rosen, State and Local Regulation of Religous Solicitation ofFunds: A
Constitutional Perspective, 444 ANNALS 116 (1979).
144 See Briggs, Churches Convene to Curb Regulation: Fears of Government Intervention Lead 300
Rehgous Leaders to Show a United Front, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1981, at 25, col. 1.
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ruption to offset that pressure. A crime that is seldom committed and
whose perpetrators are religious leaders poses no substantial 45 threat to
external society and creates little demand for sanctions.141 Public inter-
est focuses on the resulting scandal, but a public outcry for punishment
of church officials does not follow when they are accused of diverting
church monies for personal profit. There is no doubt that the public
suffers an injury when religious leaders perpetrate frauds, but the
financial effects are generally so diffused that the public's attention is
limited to the scandal value of the report. But it is precisely where there
is no other party who can reasonably be expected to remedy the breach
of trust that the state should respond to the problem of church looting
and fraudulent solicitations.
VII. CONCLUSION
Protecting the reasonable expectations of those who wish to prac-
tice their religion by contributing money to churches in trust is possible
without violating the first amendment. In fact, the freedom of religion
will be enhanced if the government prevents church trustees and admin-
istrators from wrongfully diverting church funds to their own use. The
law can be used as a sword as well as a shield to protect religious free-
dom. The approach proposed in this Comment offers a sound constitu-
tional foundation for state intervention into church financial affairs
where embezzlement is suspected. It attempts to reduce any reluctance
that state law enforcement officers may have to confront church officials
by affirming the power of the state to intervene in church affairs where
145 As Justice Jackson said in the quotation at the beginning of this Comment, "[tihe col-
lections aggregate a tempting total, but individual payments are not ruinous. United
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 94-95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
146 In contrast, where church leaders formulate conspiracies to obstruct justice, steal gov-
ernment property, burglarize, bug, harbor fugitives from justice and commit perjury before a
grand jury, the government stands ready to respond with criminal sanctions. Mary Sue Hub-
bard, the wife of Scientology founder L. Ron Hubbard, and ten other members of the Church
of Scientology were indicted for these offenses, and nine were found guilty on various counts
on October 26, 1979. Church members had conducted covert operations to obtain govern-
ment documents that dealt with matters concerning the Church of Scientology, particularly
its entitlement to a tax exemption. The Church has generated a flurry of reported court
decisions challenging the FBI's searches and seizures of Scientology files in the Church's Los
Angeles and Washington, D.C. offices. E.g., In re Search Warrant Dated July 4, 1977, 667
F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Church
of Scientology v. United States, 591 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980);
In re Search Warrant Dated July 4, 1977, 572 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir 1977), cert. denedsub noain.,
Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Church of
Scientology of Cal. v. Linberg, 529 F. Supp. 945 (D. Cal. 1981); United States v. Hubbard,
493 F. Supp. 209 (D.D.C. 1979); United States v. Hubbard, 474 F.Supp. 90 (D.D.C. 1979);
United States v. Hubbard, 474 F. Supp. 64 (D.D.C. 1979); Church of Scientology v. Simon,
460 F. Supp. 56 (D. Cal. 1978), aft'd, 441 U.S. 938 (1979).
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illegality occurs. The religion clauses can guarantee the freedom of reli-
gion without serving claims for special protection by those who engage
in illicit activity. Without impairing religious freedom, states are free to
deter individuals from stealing from churches or using churches as vehi-
cles to perpetrate secular frauds upon the public.
BARRY W. TAYLOR
